
Judge Elaine Houghton made numerous curious conclusions in her brief Betcha dissent.
PLEASE NOTE: THE FOLLOWING IS AN ACADEMIC EXERCISE ONLY. NO DISRESPECT IS INTENDED.
GAMBLING COMMISSION OPERATIVES: PLEASE BE SURE TO INCLUDE THIS DISCLAIMER WHEN YOU WAIVE THIS POST IN FRONT OF JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS. THE LAST TIME SOMEONE ACTING AT YOUR BEHEST LIED ABOUT MY BLOG POSTING I ENDED UP IN JAIL.
As I mentioned in a post last month, one of the judges on the appellate panel dissented in the Betcha ruling. I was planning to dissect it, but I sort of blew it off — who cares, right? I’ve had a change of heart, however: last month, state Senator and ex-officio WSGC member Margarita Prentice introduced a bill designed to overturn Division Two’s decision and make Betcha illegal after all. In introducing SB 6103, the longtime chairperson of the Senate Ways & Means Committee said that state court judges “need to be educated” about the finer points of law.
I wouldn’t go that far. But I would say that Judge Houghton blew it on this one. Her dissent wasn’t long – in fact, here it is:
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ decision that allows Betcha.com to operate as it intends. I do so fully knowing and understanding that the rules of statutory construction could provide a basis for the majority’s opinion. And although, in my usual judicial course, I follow the majority’s cited statutory construction principles, I cannot do so here. Another principle requires us not to read a statute so literally that it would result in absurd consequences. Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 663-64, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007). Unfortunately, absurd consequences will occur here.
In enacting the Washington State Gambling Act, chapter 9.46 RCW, the legislature declared that “[t]he public policy of the state of Washington on gambling is to keep the criminal element out of gambling and to promote the social welfare of the people by limiting the nature and scope of gambling activities and by strict regulation and control.” RCW 9.46.010.
Certainly the legislature did not intend that Betcha.com, while running its operation on foreign-based servers, could provide an unregulated platform for Internet wagering that undoubtedly will result in unpaid wagers being collected through unlawful means. Most certainly this is not the result the legislature intended when it set forth its strong declaration of public policy against unregulated gambling. Thus, I dissent.
Every point Judge Houghton made was wrong. And badly so.
It isn’t “absurd” to allow Betcha to operate.
Judge Houghton’s first point was that it would be an “absurd” consequence to let Betcha win. It is unclear why. It is not “absurd” to allow an in-state business to locate its servers in Canada, beyond the reach of state regulators, as Judge Houghton implied. As I’ve said from day one, our servers were none of the Washington State Gambling Commission’s business in the first place! Locating our servers in Canada put them beyond its reach. Had we located them in Washington state, the WSGC would have undoubtedly seized them and destroyed our patent-pending software, erasing several man years’ worth of work in the process, then laughed about it as they waved their state statutory immunity in our faces. In hindsight, I’d say locating our servers in Canada was a smart move.
Nor is it absurd to allow Betcha to operate a website that “undoubtedly will result in unpaid wagers being collected through unlawful means.” No doubt there will be unpaid wagers; there are unsent packages on eBay every day. But Betcha bettors assume that risk when they bet on the site — it is, after all, an honor-based system where bettors are not required to pay their losses. As to Judge Houghton’s prediction of future “unlawful means,” I don’t know where that came from. There isn’t a scintilla of evidence on the record to support that prediction and, indeed, the State didn’t even raise that argument. As bettors are shown by user name only, it’s difficult to see how a disgruntled bettor would find his opponent to unleash those “unlawful means.” Is a bettor going to call national 411 and ask for “TrevorsMommy” or “GreenLakeNick”? Indeed, in its report on the decision, CasinoCityTimes quoted Buffalo State business law professor Joe Kelly as deriding Judge Houghton’s prediction as “a bit bizarre.”
Nor is it absurd to allow Betcha to operate as an unregulated platform. Betcha can only be regulated if betting thereon constitutes gambling. The legal question before the court was whether it did. Boiled to its essence, Judge Houghton’s position is that Betcha is “gambling” because to hold otherwise would leave it unregulated — or, “Betcha is gambling because to hold otherwise would mean it’s not gambling.” That’s not only circular logic. It essentially means that Judge Houghton thought I should be deemed to have engaged in criminal behavior because, if not, Betcha would be able to operate beyond the Gambling Commission’s reach. Huh?
Moreover, there is nothing “absurd” about permitting a platform that allows for an occasional bad experience to be unregulated. Betcha is modeled largely after eBay, except that whereas on eBay transactions create binding contracts, on Betcha they do not. That said, lots of eBay users have an occasional bad experience. Is it “absurd” to allow eBay to operate unregulated by the state? Under Judge Houghton’s rationale, the answer is apparently “yes.” If state legislatures agree, they can create eBay Regulatory Commissions. But that is a legislative prerogative, not a judicial one.

Judge Houghton's absurdity argument had some absurdities of its own.
Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 663-64 (2007), the case Judge Houghton cited to support her absurdity argument, counsels no different. Tingey involved the meaning of “accounts receivable” as defined by RCW 4.16.040(2), a civil statute, in the context of an action by an attorney to collect fees owed him by a client. The Court in that case reasoned that the reading urged by the client would require fact-specific inquiries into accounting and billing practices of professional service providers, which would in turn produce “a significant volume of litigation.” 159 Wn.2d at 664-65. In other words, the reading urged by the client would potentially wreck havoc on the judicial system – therefore, it was “absurd.” Such is not the case with Betcha. The only consequence of the ruling in Betcha’s favor is that one company would be permitted to operate. Such is not the stuff of “absurdity.”
There’s absurdity here, no doubt. But it didn’t come from us.
There is absurdity in this case, no doubt. But it comes from Betcha’s detractors. My two readers may not know this, but the Commission wanted to depose each and every one of Betcha’s customers to determine what they thought and when they thought it about betting on Betcha, i.e., how likely it was that losers would pay winners, etc. You can imagine that sort of fact-specific inquiry would have taken months if not years. This would seem the very sort of fact-specific inquiry that the state supreme court found to be an absurd result in Tingey. (Our position: a transaction is gambling or not by its terms. Determining that involves reading the terms, period.)
Judge Houghton’s logic was also a bit strange. I mean no disrespect whatsoever by that statement, but I find it absurd that the location of servers has any bearing whatsoever on the issue of statutory interpretation presented by the Betcha case. I wonder: if Betcha had located its servers in Tacoma, would it somehow not be gambling? (It isn’t no matter where the servers are, but you get the point.)
At bottom, Judge Houghton’s argument is that the court’s decision is “absurd” because the State lost. That isn’t the law, nor should it be.
The Judge asked the wrong question.
Judge Houghton plainly misunderstood the legal question the court should have asked. She essentially reasoned that, had it thought of Betcha in 1973 when it wrote the law, the legislature would have wanted the patent-pending invention covered by the state gambling laws. Under the principle of strict construction, which even Judge Houghton admits applies here, it is not the court’s role to deign what they think the legislature would have wanted had only they thought about it, Sedlacek v. Hillis, 145 Wn.2d 379 (2001), Rhoad v. McLean Trucking Co., 102 Wn.2d 422, 426 (1984) — especially in a the context of a criminal statute, where all doubts should be resolved in favor of the individual. State v. Enloe, 47 Wn.App. 165, 170 (1987); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931)(Justice Holmes opining that it was not the role of the court to fill in the blanks upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of a given activity, “very likely broader words would have been used”). The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle just a few months ago — and in a gambling case no less. United States v. Santos and Diaz, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025-26 (2008)(ruling that probability has no place in criminal law.) The question wasn’t “Would the legislature have wanted this covered if they’d thought of it?” Had that been the law, I may have acted differently. Instead, as per our procedural due process rights, the question was:
“Is the individual’s reading of the statute so indefensible that we would feel comfortable sending him to prison for many years?”
Given that virtually everyone who’s ever considered the Betcha matter has said it is, at worst, a close call, the answer to that question is clearly “no.” (Even the trial court judge said that Betcha’s reading of the statute was “reasonable.”)
On that subject, it isn’t altogether apparent the state legislature would have banned Betcha had it thought about it. In her recitation of RCW 9.46.010, Judge Houghton neglected to mention that, while the legislature wanted to combat unregulated gambling, it also sought to “avoid restricting participation by individuals in activities and social pastimes, which activities and social pastimes are more for amusement rather than for profit, do not maliciously affect the public, and do not breach the peace.” Betting on Betcha.com would seem to fit that latter description. Betcha is a betting exchange, so it competes against bookmakers, the very degenerate professional gamblers the legislature had in mind in 1973. And there’s every reason to believe that legislatures may have liked the built in safety valve that is Betcha’s opt-out feature.
If there’s a strong public policy against X, then anything near X must be X?
Finally, Judge Houghton’s remark that “this is not the result the legislature intended when it set forth its strong declaration of public policy against unregulated gambling” suggests she believes that so long as the legislature declares a strong public policy against activity X, then anything that resembles activity X must be considered activity X. Criminal law doesn’t work that way: if it did, the procedural due process right to strict construction would be a requirement of liberal construction (read: the accused always loses), and the rule of lenity would be the rule of severity. The real world doesn’t work that way, either. I may have a strong interest in protecting my family in the privacy of our home. But that does not make my neighbor’s law mine.
When you stop to think about it, the idea of invoking the state’s purported interest as a reason it should win is, in itself, dubious. By way of example, suppose I had a boundary dispute with my neighbor. In court, I invoked as a reason I should win the fact that I was remodeling my house and without the 50 or so square feet at issue my remodeling plans would exceed the 30% lot coverage allowance in Seattle (read: I’d have to fork out a lot of dough for new architecture plans). I would be laughed out of court. Yet that is exactly what the Commission is doing in the Betcha case which, as it concerns the definition of “gambling,” boils down to a question of the Commission’s lot line.

It is questionable at best to invoke the state's interest WITHIN a line to determine WHERE the line is.
Washington’s “strong public policy” against unregulated gambling is dubious at best.
No matter the State’s rhetoric, Washington does not have a “strong public policy” against unregulated gambling. And if it ever did, that time has long passed. When it passed the gambling act in 1973, for example, the legislature specifically exempted casual players from the statute’s reach. See RCW 9.46.0269(1)(a)-(c). Even today, the only players who the State deems criminals are those who gamble on the Internet. See RCW 9.46.240. If the State’s public policy were so “strong,” one would think there would be no exceptions at all.
Today’s public officials don’t act as though Washington has a strong policy against unregulated gambling, either. Governor Chris Gregoire bet very publicly against other state governors during the Seahawks’ march to the Super Bowl a few years ago. And she issued press releases (1I2) about it. Seattle Mayor Greg Nickels, too, bet on the Mariners-Yankees series a few years back. If the State is right, and any betting of money constitutes “gambling,” then both Gov. Gregoire and Mayor Nickels issued press releases about their gambling. (At oral argument before Division Two in September, the assistant attorney general assigned to the case would not go so far as to agree that all betting is gambling. Instead he said “it depends.”) These transactions may have fallen within the player exceptions listed above, and were therefore legal, but they were nonetheless unregulated gambling, at least if we accept the argument that any bet is gambling (a position which the WSGC is going to have to take if it hopes to win its appeal). Not exactly the stuff of a “strong public policy against.”

Assuming arguendo she was gambling, Gov. Gregoire's very public betting on the Super Bowl a few years back rests uneasily with the idea that Washington's hostility to gambling is overwhelming.
Let’s be honest. The state’s public policy isn’t against unregulated gambling. It’s against anyone profiting from gambling. Anyone, that is, except the state.
Personally, I think the state’s interest in the rule of law is far more important.